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JURISDICTION IN THE TRUMP ERA 
Scott Dodson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States induced 
immediate speculation about how his tenure would affect various areas of the 
law.1  In civil-procedure circles, the intuition is that his status as a pro-
business, antiregulation Republican seems likely to push procedural doctrine 
generally in pro-defendant directions.2  That intuition seems sound in the 
specific procedural subtopic of jurisdictional doctrine relating to forum 
selection.3 
Forum matters to litigants, sometimes a great deal.4  Forum affects the 
relative cost of litigation by forcing distant parties to spend more on the 
litigation than they might otherwise.  Forum selection can be law selection, 
in both procedure and substance, because different courts will apply different 
laws to the dispute.  The forum determines the range of judges who may 
preside over the case and the range of jurors who will resolve factual disputes 
in a jury trial.  For these reasons, forum choice is a litigation advantage. 
One can assume that legal actors with strong pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant 
predispositions will attempt to slant the law of forum selection to give the 
preferred side of a litigation more forum choice and restrict the forum choice 
of the other side.5  With regard to the Trump administration, Trump’s pro-
 
*  Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, 
UC Hastings College of the Law.  I am grateful to Professor Howard M. Erichson and the 
Fordham Law Review for inviting me to participate in this Symposium, Civil Litigation 
Reform in the Trump Era:  Threats and Opportunities, held at Fordham University School of 
Law on February 23, 2018, and to Rick Marcus for helpful comments on an early draft.  
 
 1. See generally, e.g., Scott Dodson et al., The 2016 Presidential Election:  The Next 
Four Years and Beyond, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 255 (2017). 
 2. See Symposium, Civil Litigation Reform in the Trump Era:  Threats & Opportunities, 
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 19 (2018). 
 3. Elsewhere, I have argued that jurisdiction is definitionally akin to forum selection, but 
I recognize that current jurisdictional doctrine professes to be both broader and narrower than 
forum selection. See generally Scott Dodson, Defending Jurisdiction, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. ONLINE 85 (2018); Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619 (2017). 
 4. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 
1921 (2009) (“Forum is worth fighting over because outcome often turns on forum . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005). 
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business background and rhetoric,6 plus Republican control of both chambers 
of Congress, might induce predictions of a dramatic departure from the 
jurisdictional trends of the Obama administration. 
But, curiously, forum doctrines—especially personal jurisdiction and 
diversity jurisdiction—were already trending in pro-defendant directions 
during the Obama administration for several years before Donald Trump was 
even a presidential candidate.7  The Trump era thus portends a continuation 
and validation of that trend, rather than a departure from it. 
In this Essay, I document recent pre-Trump, pro-defendant trends in 
personal jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction, and I detail how those trends 
impose significant burdens on plaintiffs.  I then explain why the remainder 
of Trump’s presidency is likely to entrench those trends through judicial 
appointments, rulemaker stasis, and congressional efforts.  The result is 
likely to be less an alteration of pre-Trump law than a reinforcement and 
expansion of it. 
I.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Personal jurisdiction—the power of a court over a litigant—has balanced 
plaintiff and defendant interests for decades.  Though historically a doctrine 
steeped in policing interstate relations,8 the modern incarnation of personal 
jurisdiction is grounded in the due process rights of litigants.9  While state 
interests and territorial borders are still relevant to personal jurisdiction, state 
geography has become a means of assessing the critical inquiry—fairness to 
 
 6. Sam Schechner, IBM CEO:  Executives Like Trump’s Pro-Business Promises, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2017, 5:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-ceo-executives-like-
trumps-pro-business-promises-1484823068 [https://perma.cc/E6W5-PWBZ]. 
 7. See infra Parts I.B, II.B.  There are some notable exceptions, to be sure.  The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created during Obama’s presidency and, during 
that time, the agency proposed a rule banning companies from using arbitration clauses to 
disadvantage certain consumer plaintiffs seeking redress in court; however, in November 
2017, President Trump signed a joint congressional resolution nullifying the rule. CFPB Issues 
Rule to Ban Companies from Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day 
in Court, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-
using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court/ [https://perma.cc/LG6T-
9Z6P]. 
 8. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is 
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”).  See 
generally Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017) (documenting 
the history of personal jurisdiction and Pennoyer). 
 9. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (focusing on whether 
a nonresident’s contacts with the forum state made it “reasonable” for the court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction in light of the “‘inconveniences’ which would result . . . from a trial away 
from [the nonresident’s] ‘home’”); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and 
protects an individual liberty interest.  It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a 
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”). 
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the defendant—as measured by the defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the 
forum state.10 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction Development 
From 1945 to 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court developed standards in an 
attempt to balance the various interests at stake in personal jurisdiction and 
flesh out its contours.  Not all movement was in a pro-plaintiff direction,11 
but at least two trends appeared to be.  First, the Court suggested that a state 
could exercise “general” jurisdiction over a defendant who had “continuous 
and systematic” contacts with the forum state even if the cause of action was 
unrelated to those contacts.12  This standard for general jurisdiction was 
“taught to generations of first-year law students” and was applied by lower 
courts for decades.13  This standard effectively allowed plaintiffs to sue a 
company in any state in which it did business; for many large corporations, 
that meant in any state in the Union.14  Though tempered by venue rules and 
other forum restrictions,15 general jurisdiction gave plaintiffs broad choice of 
forum when suing national corporations. 
Second, the Court seemed open to relaxing “specific” jurisdiction’s 
required nexus between the defendant and the forum by allowing actors other 
than the defendant to help establish that nexus.  For example, in Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,16 the Court agreed that third-party 
 
 10. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17 (setting out the “minimum contacts” formulation); 
see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017) 
(repeating that formulation). 
 11. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114, 116, 121 
(1987) (agreeing that “fairness” factors could weigh against the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1980) 
(refusing to allow the unilateral conduct of the plaintiff to establish the required connection 
between the defendant and the forum state). 
 12. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416–17 (1984) 
(reasoning that the defendant’s activities in the forum did not “constitute the kind of 
continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to” support general 
jurisdiction in prior precedent”); cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (acknowledging that personal 
jurisdiction can attach when “continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities”). 
 13. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); 
see also Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 
767 (1988) (“Courts currently measure the sufficiency of unrelated business contacts between 
the forum state and the defendant with the continuous and systematic test . . . .”). 
 14. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New 
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2014) (stating as 
conventional wisdom “that national corporations with substantial operations in all fifty states 
(such as McDonalds or WalMart) would likely be subject to general personal jurisdiction in 
all fifty states”); William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
599, 614 n.88 (1993) (“General jurisdiction may also exist over out-of-staters if their forum 
connections are very substantial.  For example, most states will have general jurisdiction over 
McDonalds.”). 
 15. For a summary of those subconstitutional controls on forum, see William S. Dodge & 
Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1242–46 (2018). 
 16. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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intermediaries in the stream of commerce could help create the necessary link 
between the defendant and the state of injury.17  And in Calder v. Jones,18 
the Court held that California could exercise specific jurisdiction over a 
libelous magazine article’s Florida-based author and editor because their 
Florida conduct had “effects” in California, which was the residence of the 
plaintiff and the locus of her reputation.19 
Both Asahi and Calder expanded the range of states having the potential 
to exercise specific jurisdiction over a particular defendant.  Coupled with 
the likelihood that interstate businesses would be subject to general 
jurisdiction in multiple states under the “continuous and systematic” test, 
plaintiffs appeared to have a relatively wide range of forum choice in many 
lawsuits. 
B.  A Restrictive Turn 
Beginning in 2011, the Court’s personal jurisdiction opinions dramatically 
scaled back plaintiffs’ forum choices.  In a pair of general jurisdiction cases 
decided in 2011 and 2014, the Court, nearly unanimously, discarded the 
“continuous and systematic” test and instead confined general jurisdiction to 
the states in which the defendant is “at home”; paradigmatically, the 
defendant’s domicile (if an individual) or state of incorporation and principal 
place of business (if a corporation).20  Importantly, the new “at home” test is 
a comparative one, which limits the range of general jurisdiction to the one 
or two states in which the defendant is most at home.21  As a result, for 
Walmart, only Delaware (its state of incorporation) and Arkansas (where it 
has its headquarters)—not California (where it does much of its business)—
can exercise general jurisdiction.22  And, for foreign corporations, likely no 
state would be able to exercise general jurisdiction.23 
As for specific jurisdiction, the Court, in a different pair of decisions 
decided in 2011 and 2014, tightened the required nexus between the 
defendant and the forum in ways that reduce the range of plausible litigation 
forums.  In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,24 Justice Kennedy, 
 
 17. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 18. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 783–85. 
 20. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751, 761 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).  The Court reaffirmed these decisions 
in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
 21. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (“[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not ‘focu[s] 
solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.’  General jurisdiction instead calls 
for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.  A 
corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” 
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 22. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 29–30). 
 23. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 15, at 1220.  The Court has left open the possibility 
that, in an exceptional case, a corporation might be essentially at home in a state that is not its 
place of incorporation or formal headquarters. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 & n.19. 
 24. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
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writing for a plurality of four justices that included the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia, would have cast personal jurisdiction as a consent-to-sovereign-
authority doctrine where consent could be inferred only by a defendant’s 
purposeful, specific, and direct connection with the forum state.25  Justices 
Breyer and Alito penned a concurrence that relied simply on precedent and 
found that more purposeful and direct connection with the forum state was 
required when the quantity of connections was small.26  Notably, both the 
plurality and the concurrence rejected the dissent’s vision of specific 
jurisdiction as grounded primarily in fairness and reasonableness.27 
In Walden v. Fiore,28 the Court limited the interpretive reach of Calder by 
casting that case as focused on the defendants’ contacts with California 
independent of the plaintiff’s status as a California resident.29  Walden 
refocuses the inquiry on whether “the defendant’s suit-related conduct . . . 
create[s] a substantial connection with the forum State.”30  In addition, “the 
plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.  
Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection 
with the forum State.”31  Walden thus requires a direct link between the 
defendant’s purposeful conduct and the forum state.32 
C.  Effects 
This restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction narrows the range of possible 
forums open to plaintiffs and increasingly funnels cases into the home states 
of defendants.  The recent general jurisdiction cases do that intentionally, 
limiting general jurisdiction to the one or two states where the defendant is 
fairly considered to be “at home.”33  Specific jurisdiction offers opportunities 
to sue defendants outside their home states if the defendant’s conduct caused 
injury in the forum; however, the recent cases demand a particularly strong 
and direct nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the state of injury to 
do so.  These cases also encourage corporations to use commercial 
intermediaries to further limit the likely applicability of specific jurisdiction 
in the state of injury.  Consequently, some plaintiffs may choose to avoid a 
personal jurisdiction fight in the state of injury by electing to file in the 
defendant’s home state. 
 
 25. Id. at 880–84 (plurality opinion). 
 26. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“None of our precedents finds that a single isolated 
sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”). 
 27. Compare id. at 899–906 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (relying upon principles of fairness 
and reasonableness), with id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the 
dissent’s formulation), and id. at 880, 882–83 (plurality opinion) (rejecting “[f]reeform 
notions of fundamental fairness” and “reasonable foreseeability” in favor of a focus on how 
“the defendant’s actions” manifest an intent to be subject to state power). 
 28. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
 29. Id. at 1123. 
 30. Id. at 1121. 
 31. Id. at 1122. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See generally, e.g., id. 
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Restricting forum choice in this way promotes two important defendant 
interests.  First, the funneling of cases into the home states of defendants 
gives them, as a general matter, the home-field advantages of close 
proximity, local favoritism, and insider knowledge, while out-of-state 
plaintiffs face the corresponding disadvantages.  Few plaintiffs, for example, 
relish the idea of suing Walmart in Bentonville, Arkansas.  Worse, if the 
defendant is a foreign entity, the plaintiff may be forced to sue abroad, where 
the relative advantages and disadvantages become significantly more 
pronounced.34 
Second, the restriction on forum availability inhibits aggregation in 
multiparty or multiclaim cases.  Aggregation is not an unabashed good in all 
instances, to be sure, but federal procedure generally favors aggregation for 
fairness and efficiency reasons.35  Yet, the personal jurisdiction cases 
discussed above make aggregation significantly more difficult.  If a plaintiff 
wishes to sue two defendants that are not at home in a common state, the 
plaintiff may be forced to sue the defendants separately.36  And if multiple 
plaintiffs wish to sue those two defendants for similar injuries that arose in 
different states, then not even the state of injury would allow joinder of the 
claims in a common forum.37  The resulting disaggregation allows 
defendants to deploy an “empty chair” defense38 and force plaintiffs to bear 
the costs and expense of multiple lawsuits, costs which corporate defendants 
often bear more easily than plaintiffs. 
Some might argue that personal jurisdiction’s recent trend toward 
restricting plaintiff forum selection is less a pro-defendant effort than an 
equilibration of historically excessive forum choice, but it is hard to see how 
that is the case when defendants can consent and extract consent to personal 
jurisdiction.  If, for example, the state of injury is particularly favorable to a 
defendant for some reason, then the defendant can consent to personal 
jurisdiction there no matter how attenuated its conduct with the state.  
Further, if aggregation is to the defense advantage, then defendants can 
consent to personal jurisdiction in the forum to allow aggregation on their 
own terms.  Finally, business entities with strong bargaining power have 
nearly unfettered power to select favorable states for litigation—even though 
those states are otherwise unavailable under personal jurisdiction law—
through contractual forum-selection clauses, which the Obama-era Supreme 
Court unanimously endorsed.39 
 
 34. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 15, at 1229 n.156. 
 35. See Dodson, supra note 22, at 7–16.  For a recent history of aggregation, see Judith 
Resnik, “Vital” State Interests:  From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to 
Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 
1779–80 (2017). 
 36. See Dodson, supra note 22, at 42–43. 
 37. See id. at 43.  Things are more complicated for class actions. See id. at 37. 
 38. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 217 (1994) (“[A] defendant will often 
argue the ‘empty chair’ in the hope of convincing the jury that the [absent defendant] was 
exclusively responsible for the damage.”). 
 39. See generally Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).  For 
discussions of that power, see generally Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party 
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II.  DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
Unlike personal jurisdiction, which determines the geographic range of 
forum options, diversity jurisdiction divides state and federal courts.  
Diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear certain cases based on 
state law if the parties are citizens of different states.40  Historically, diversity 
jurisdiction has been justified on the ground that a federal forum is necessary 
to alleviate the perception of state bias against out-of-state litigants, though 
other reasons for diversity jurisdiction do exist.41 
A.  Traditional Scope of Diversity Jurisdiction 
The Constitution authorizes diversity jurisdiction over controversies 
“between Citizens of different States,”42 which, the Supreme Court has held, 
requires only “minimal diversity” between at least one plaintiff’s citizenship 
and at least one defendant’s.43 
Nevertheless, for much of diversity jurisdiction’s history, Congress and 
the Supreme Court have restrained its scope.  The First Congress partially 
implemented the constitutional grant by passing a statute granting district 
courts jurisdiction over suits “between a citizen of the State where the suit is 
brought, and a citizen of another State.”44  The 1806 case Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss45 stands for the proposition that the diversity-jurisdiction statute 
authorizes diversity jurisdiction in multiparty cases only for cases involving 
complete diversity of citizenship.46  Congress has imposed an amount-in-
controversy requirement on diversity jurisdiction and has raised the limit on 
that requirement with regularity.47  Throughout the 1900s, movements 
among prominent jurists to abolish or restrict diversity jurisdiction 
proliferated,48 and some restrictions—such as expanding the citizenship of 
corporations to include their state of principal place of business and limiting 
alienage jurisdiction for lawful permanent residents—were codified.49 
 
Preference, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 675 (2015) and Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal 
Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 41. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 
122–36 (2003). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 43. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). 
 44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 45. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 46. For more detail about Strawbridge’s complete diversity rule and its subsequent 
interpretation, see Scott Dodson & Philip A. Pucillo, Joint and Several Jurisdiction, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 1323, 1330–31 (2016). 
 47. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction?  Historical Foundations and 
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 1, 23–24 (1996). 
 48. Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 98 (“Every 
administration since President Carter’s, the Judicial Conference, the American Law Institute, 
state courts, numerous public interest and legal aid organizations, and most legal scholars 
support the abolition or curtailment of diversity [jurisdiction].”). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (1958) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c) (2012)); see Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 203(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (codified 
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B.  Recent Expansions 
In the last two decades, however, the scope of diversity jurisdiction has 
been more expansion friendly.50  In 1999 and 2002, Congress codified 
minimal diversity in the Y2K Act51 and the Multiparty, Multiform Trial 
Jurisdiction Act,52 respectively.  In 2005, Congress more broadly expanded 
diversity jurisdiction by passing the Class Action Fairness Act,53 which 
codifies minimal diversity for most interstate class actions, eliminates 
barriers to removal of those class actions, and circumscribes the citizenships 
of unincorporated businesses who are parties to such class actions.54 
During this time, corporate and defense interest groups ramped up their 
efforts to lobby for greater access to federal courts through diversity 
jurisdiction.  For example, the National Association of Manufacturers 
commissioned a study that supported the abrogation of the Strawbridge 
complete-diversity rule and a widespread return to minimal diversity.55 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend,56 which held that a corporation’s principal place of business is “the 
place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities,” typically its headquarters.57  In 
giving the statute this construction, the Court “place[d] primary weight upon 
the need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as 
simple as possible.”58  This simplification gives corporations more power to 
control their citizenships for diversity jurisdiction purposes because it is far 
easier to manipulate a central headquarters than diffuse business operations.  
Indeed, a corporation could fairly easily isolate its citizenship in just one state 
 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012)).  One notable expansion of diversity jurisdiction 
during this era was the Federal Interpleader Act, which granted federal jurisdiction based on 
minimal diversity for the narrow category of interpleader actions. See generally Federal 
Interpleader Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 929 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012)). 
 50. One outlier is Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016), 
which adhered to the diversity-hindering rule that unincorporated associations take the 
citizenships of their members. Id. at 1014. 
 51. Pub. L. 106-37, § 15, 113 Stat. 185, 201 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6614 (2012)). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020(b)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 1725, 1826 (2002) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012)). 
 53. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9–12 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) (2012)). 
 54. See C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487, 489 (2006). 
 55. JOANNA SHEPHERD, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS, ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF A MINIMAL 
DIVERSITY STANDARD ON FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 4 (2015), http://www.nam.org/ 
Advocacy/The-Center-for-Legal-Action/Estimating-the-Impact-of-a-Minimal-Diversity-
Standard-on-Federal-Court-Caseloads.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBM4-GLQC]. 
 56. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
 57. Id. at 80–81. 
 58. Id. at 80; see also id. at 94 (“[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in a 
jurisdictional statute . . . .  Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and 
money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court 
to decide those claims . . . .  Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage 
gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and settlements will reflect a 
claim’s legal and factual merits.  Judicial resources too are at stake . . . .  Simple jurisdictional 
rules also promote greater predictability.”). 
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by establishing its headquarters in its state of incorporation (or, more 
provocatively, overseas, thereby enabling the invocation of federal alienage 
jurisdiction for any lawsuit by U.S. citizens). 
C.  Effects 
The defense community has long favored invoking diversity jurisdiction 
for strategic advantages.  One advantage pertains to the law applied by the 
federal forum.  Before 1938, federal court offered an entirely different 
substantive law, which largely favored corporate and defense interests.59  
Since 1938, federal court has offered uniform procedures that, in recent 
years, have evolved to benefit defendants,60 especially with respect to rules 
of pleading,61 class actions,62 summary judgment,63 and discovery.64 
A second advantage is geographical.  Unlike state courts, federal courts 
can transfer a case across state boundaries.  For defendants, that opens the 
possibility of transferring a case in federal court across state lines to more 
favorable venues, such as a defendant’s home state.65  In 2013, a unanimous 
Supreme Court made such venue transfer even more favorable to corporate 
defendants when it afforded forum-selection clauses near-dispositive weight 
in the decision to transfer a case.66  Further, transfers based on such forum-
selection clauses do not need to specify the applicable law.67 
For these reasons, expanding opportunities to invoke diversity jurisdiction 
disproportionately benefits defendants. 
 
 59. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY:  FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1870–1958 (1992).  That regime was 
(largely) put to rest by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 60. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and 
Trials on the Merits:  Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 286 (2013). 
 61. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007).  For criticisms of these cases for their detrimental impact on plaintiffs, 
see, for example, Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 65–66 
(2010). 
 62. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
729 (2013).  Many supporters of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) were motivated by 
the seemingly correct belief that federal judges would be more hostile to multistate class 
actions than their state counterparts. See David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, 
and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 
1252 (2007).  For early assessments of CAFA, see generally Symposium, Fairness to Whom?  
Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008). 
 63. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322–26 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–52 (1986); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–88 (1986). 
 64. See generally Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era?  Federal Civil Procedure After 
the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The 
Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (allowing venue transfer for the convenience of the parties 
and witnesses). 
 66. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 574–75 (2013); see id. at 
579 (“[A] proper application of § 1404(a) requires that a forum-selection clause be given 
controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.”). 
 67. Id. at 582–83. 
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III.  THE FUTURE OF JURISDICTION 
The president has limited direct influence over federal civil procedure.  
That is because civil procedure in the federal courts is developed by Congress 
(infrequently) through statutes, the Supreme Court through the rulemaking 
process,68 and the federal courts through the interpretive process.  None of 
these entities reports to the president. 
Nevertheless, the president exerts some indirect influence over federal 
civil procedure.  The president certainly influences congressional agendas, 
and a Congress controlled by the president’s political party is more likely to 
press an agenda that the president supports.69  In addition, the president 
appoints federal judges, including justices of the Supreme Court, with the 
Senate’s confirmation.70  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in turn, 
appoints members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  This 
committee is the primary body that considers and drafts amendments to the 
federal rules, the membership of which is dominated by lower federal judges 
that the president may have appointed to the bench.71  So, even without 
direct, formal influence over federal civil procedure, the president does wield 
some indirect and structural influences. 
In the case of President Trump, several influences are palpable.  First, he 
began his presidency with a Republican-controlled Congress primed to 
embrace business interests lobbied by pro-defendant groups like the 
Chamber of Commerce.  Second, Trump appointed Neil Gorsuch, thus far a 
reliable conservative vote, to the Supreme Court, has nominated Brett 
Kavanaugh, another seemingly reliable conservative vote, to replace Justice 
Kennedy, and may have the opportunity to appoint others if additional 
vacancies arise.  Third, Trump has already nominated and had twenty-three 
federal judges confirmed, and he will likely nominate many more.72 
These indirect influences suggest that the recent defense-centric trends in 
personal jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction chronicled above will 
continue or accelerate in the Trump administration.  There is some evidence 
that that is already occurring. 
 
 68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).  For a history of the Rules Enabling Act, see generally 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
 69. See George C. Edwards III & Andrew Barrett, Presidential Agenda Setting in 
Congress, in POLARIZED POLITICS:  CONGRESS AND THE PRESSURES IN A PARTISAN ERA 109, 
127 (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds., 2000); George C. Edwards III et al., The Legislative 
Impact of Divided Government, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 545, 561–62 (1997). 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 71. See Scott Dodson, Should the Rules Committees Have an Amicus Role?, 104 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2018); About the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-conference 
[https://perma.cc/8LTP-7DDG] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) . 
 72. See How Trump Is Making a Lasting Impact on Nation’s Courts, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 
2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-impact-supreme-court-district-
judges-appointments/ [https://perma.cc/2VDS-FCPJ].  Nearly one hundred judges have been 
appointed and await confirmation. See Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies [https://perma.cc/73AJ-
RQAZ] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
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A.  Personal Jurisdiction 
The appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court to fill the seat left 
vacant by longtime conservative Justice Antonin Scalia seems unlikely to 
change the trajectory of the Court on matters of personal jurisdiction and 
diversity jurisdiction, as early indications suggest Gorsuch votes much like 
Scalia did.73  The better prediction is that the Court will continue or even 
expand the trends it has already started. 
Two cases from 2017, both eight-to-one decisions whose majorities 
included Justice Gorsuch, tend to validate that prediction.  In BNSF Railway 
Co. v. Tyrrell,74 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Daimler AG v. Bauman 
test for general jurisdiction.75  And, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court,76 the Court further narrowed specific jurisdiction by demanding a 
close nexus between the forum and the claim.77  Bristol-Myers Squibb is a 
particularly important case because it continues Walden’s erosion of more 
relaxed relationships between the forum, the claim, and the defendant78 and 
because it seems to validate the Nicastro plurality’s reinvigoration of state 
sovereignty.79  These two cases indicate that the restrictive turn of personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence is likely to continue or accelerate in the Trump 
era.80 
Two issues do present possible opportunities for countertrends in personal 
jurisdiction.  The first is the possibility that Congress or the Supreme Court 
will expand, by statute or rule, the scope of personal jurisdiction in federal 
courts.  Congress has, in the past, occasionally provided for nationwide 
personal jurisdiction in federal courts for certain kinds of claims,81 and it 
could expand those opportunities.  Similarly, although Rule 4(k) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confines federal courts’ personal 
jurisdiction in most other cases to their states’ borders, the Supreme Court 
could promulgate a rule amendment broadening the scope of Rule 4’s 
 
 73. See Lola Fadulu, Neil Gorsuch’s Early Opinions Reveal a Deeply Conservative 
Supreme Court Justice, QUARTZ (June 26, 2017), https://qz.com/1015025/neil-gorsuchs-
early-opinions-reveal-a-deeply-conservative-supreme-court-justice/ [https://perma.cc/B2FW-
28C8]. 
 74. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
 75. Id. at 1554, 1558–59.  Justice Sotomayor dissented on the same grounds she dissented 
in Daimler. See id. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 76. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 77. Id. at 1786.  For more discussion on this point, see Dodson, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
 78. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (relying on Walden and distinguishing 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)). 
 79. Id. at 1780–81 (stating that personal jurisdiction “encompasses the more abstract 
matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in 
the claims in question”). 
 80. Of course, if President Trump successfully appoints additional justices to the Supreme 
Court, he could have a profound impact on the ideological balance of the Court.  That certainly 
may occur and influence different areas of the law, but with the Court already trending, near 
unanimously, along the President’s ideological lines in the areas of personal jurisdiction and 
diversity jurisdiction, it is hard to see any appointment changing the Court’s trend in this area. 
See supra Parts I.B., II.B. 
 81. Dodson & Dodge, supra note 15, at 1236 & n.198. 
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authorization.82  The likelihood of either happening in the Trump 
administration, however, is low.  Congress appears to have no appetite for 
such expansion.83  The rulemakers have recently indicated a willingness to 
consider the expansion of Rule 4(k),84 but the likelihood of any formal 
amendment proposal is uncertain.85  And as more lower federal judges 
appointed by President Trump become candidates for membership on the 
rules committees, the possibility of personal jurisdiction reform diminishes 
further.86 
The second issue is the doctrine of implied consent to personal jurisdiction 
that some states attempt to extract through registration statutes.87  Whether a 
registration statute can confer personal jurisdiction despite the lack of 
otherwise minimum contacts is a question that is likely to ultimately be 
answered by the Supreme Court.  Since Daimler AG v. Bauman, many state 
courts and lower federal courts have held that such statutes do not confer 
personal jurisdiction.88  Given its current composition, the Supreme Court 
would likely agree.89 
 
 82. Commentators have been urging expansion of Rule 4(k) for decades. See, e.g., 
Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases:  
A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1130–33 (1989). 
 83. See Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2):  A Way 
to (Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 418–19 (2017) 
(explaining why expanding personal jurisdiction by statute is politically inviable).  Notably, 
this reluctance was seen in the Obama era as well, when repeated attempts to pass the Foreign 
Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act failed. See id. at 446 n.235. 
 84. See Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Agenda:  Meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, U.S. CTS. at 335–44 (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/2018-04-civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YX4-9MEU]. 
 85. See Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 933–
36 (2017) (observing that rulemakers increasingly prefer to make modest changes to civil 
rules). 
 86. One potentially more promising area is the expansion of personal jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations.  President Trump has voiced support for measures that improve 
American business advantages over foreign businesses and that allow U.S. federal courts to 
more easily assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants (especially if U.S. businesses are the 
plaintiffs), which means such changes might be palatable.  For one approach to that expansion, 
see generally Dodge & Dodson, supra note 15 (arguing for nationwide personal jurisdiction 
over alien defendants). 
 87. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the 
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2015) (doubting that such statutes could 
extract consent to general jurisdiction).  But see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) 
(approving a broad theory of implied consent for specific jurisdiction). 
 88. See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1069.2 
n.25 (4th ed. 2017) (collecting cases). 
 89. I note the potential irony that the Supreme Court has strongly upheld forum consent 
when plaintiffs enter into a valid contract of adhesion specifying or limiting the propriety of a 
particular forum for a dispute. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 
(1991).  In addition, the Trump administration recently abrogated a rule proposed by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that would have invalidated certain arbitration 
agreements. See Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Banker 
Praise, HILL (Nov. 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-
consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking [https://perma.cc/CH3K-
2YWU]. 
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B.  Diversity Jurisdiction 
For diversity jurisdiction, the primary movement in the Trump era has 
been congressional.  Although Trump’s presidency is still in its early stages, 
a number of bills have been introduced in Congress that would expand 
diversity jurisdiction to promote the litigation advantages of corporations 
over consumers and plaintiffs.  For example, the Innocent Party Protection 
Act, which the House passed on March 9, 2017, by a 224-194 margin,90 
would make it easier for defendants to remove cases to federal court based 
on diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff joins a party that destroys 
complete diversity.91  And Representative Steve King (R-IA) introduced a 
bill on July 27, 2017, that would define statutory diversity jurisdiction as 
minimal diversity for all cases.92 
It is worth pointing out that the advantages of federal court for corporations 
and defendants have not abated.  The Supreme Court shows little sign of 
retreating from its pro-business procedural rulings.93  Meanwhile, Congress 
has become increasingly active by moving a number of bills forward that 
give defendants more procedural advantages in federal civil litigation.  For 
example, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act and Furthering Asbestos 
Claims Transparency Act, which passed the House on March 9, 2017, by a 
220-201 vote,94 mandates increased reporting of payments to plaintiffs by 
trusts that pay out asbestos-exposure claims against bankrupt companies.95  
The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, which passed the House on March 10, 
2017, by a 230-188 vote,96 requires the imposition of sanctions on plaintiffs 
and their attorneys for filing meritless lawsuits.97  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing on a similar bill on November 8, 2017.98  Other 
bills affecting civil procedure in federal court that have passed the House 
include a medical-malpractice overhaul99 and a bill to reform the citizen-suit 
process.100  All this is to say that diversity jurisdiction trends are likely to 
continue to advantage defendants in the coming years. 
 
 90. 163 CONG. REC. H2003–04 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2017). 
 91. H.R. 725, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 92. H.R. 3487, 115th Cong. (2017).  In September 2017, the bill was referred by the House 
Judiciary Committee to the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice. 163 CONG. 
REC. H6516 (daily ed. July 27, 2017). 
 93. See, e.g., TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 
(2017) (restricting patent plaintiffs’ venue options).  Class actions may present a more mixed 
future, though that may be because the Court has already taken class actions to the brink of 
extinction. See Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II:  A Respite from the Decline, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971, 972 (2017) (opining that the decline of class actions is unlikely to 
reverse course but shows signs of stabilizing). 
 94. 163 CONG. REC. H1999–H2000 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2017). 
 95. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 96. 163 CONG. REC. H2039–41 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2017). 
 97. H.R. 720, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 98. S. 237, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 99. H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017).  This bill passed the House 218 to 210 in June 2017. 
163 CONG. REC. H5286–87 (daily ed. June 28, 2017). 
 100. H.R. 469, 115th Cong. (2017).  This bill passed the House 234 to 187 in October 2017. 
See 163 CONG. REC. H8208–09 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
In some ways, the pro-defendant developments in personal jurisdiction and 
diversity jurisdiction since the election of Donald Trump are not surprising.  
What is perhaps more surprising is that they do not mark a dramatic break 
from the Obama years.  The courts, Congress, and rulemakers had already 
begun a pro-defendant trend before Trump became president.  Trump era 
developments, then, are better seen as continuations or expansions of those 
trends. 
A final point is worth noting:  the Trump era’s impact will likely persist 
after Trump leaves office.  Legislation, once passed, is difficult to undo.  
Court decisions like Tyrrell add to the density of precedent.  And President 
Trump’s federal judicial appointees serve under life tenure.  Trump’s 
influence will be felt well after the end of his presidency. 
 
